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A New Trade Strategy: The Case For
Bilateral Agreements
A rare window of political and economic opportunity opened last Janu-
ary when the United States and Canada concluded a major bilateral
trade accord: the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement ("FTA"). l
Although not perfect, the FTA represents an important step forward in
an era during which retreat has been the rule. The FTA helps dispel
some of the myths surrounding United States trade policy. It proves to
skeptics both here and abroad that the United States can make progress
in the trade realm. Even under difficult economic conditions, the United
States still can conclude trade agreements with its major trading part-
ners. More importantly, the FTA debunks the conventional wisdom by
demonstrating that successful trade agreements can be negotiated bilat-
erally as well as multilaterally.
The new President finds himself at a crucial juncture. Should he
follow the example of the FTA and aggressively seek new bilateral trade
agreements or should he continue to focus on multilateral accords? The
new President has a unique opportunity to harness the political momen-
tum created by the FTA. If he acts early and decisively, the President
can conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements that advance the
United States' economic interests. If he falls into the trap of excessive
reliance on multilateralism, he may squander this opportunity.
This Article argues that future United States trade policy should
focus more on bilateralism. First, it examines current United States
trade problems, giving particular consideration to the predominant
influence of multilateralism. Second, the Article outlines the advantages
of a bilateral trade strategy. It evaluates specific candidates for future
bilateral agreements, with a special focus on a U.S.-Japanese accord.
* United States Senate, (D.-Montana); Stanford University, B.A., Economics,
1964; Stanford Law School, LL.B., 1967; Elected U.S. Senate, 1978; Senate Finance
Committee; Chairman, International Trade Subcommittee of the Senate Finance
Committee; Co-Chair, Congressional Competitiveness Caucus. My Senior
Legislative Assistant on Trade and Competitiveness, Greg Mastel, assisted
extensively in the preparation of this Article.
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Finally, the Article outlines a strategy for the new President, demon-
strating the compatibility of bilateral and multilateral agreements. Far
from undermining multilateral institutions, bilaterals may offer a tool for
reinvigorating the multilateral process.
I. America's Trade Problems
A. Trade and the U.S. Economy
Since World War II, trade has become increasingly important to the
United States economy. The trade components of the nation's gross
national product increased between 200 and 400 percent since 1950.2
Today, almost 20% of the U.S. economy is linked directly to trade; fully
70% of the products America produces compete with imports.3
The expanding role of international trade has recently proved a
mixed blessing to the United States. In the last eight years, the United
States has experienced an international economic disaster. From 1980
to 1987, the nation's trade deficit swelled from $31 billion to $170 bil-
lion.4 Over the same period, the manufacturing trade balance tumbled
from a $27 billion surplus to a $138 billion deficit. 5 Individually, virtu-
ally every manufacturing industry had a lower trade balance in 1987
than in 1980.6 The trade deficit is now larger than the GNP of all but 20
nations. 7 In human terms, the $170 billion trade deficit means that
between two and four million Americans have lost their jobs over the
last seven years.8
In order to finance this growing deficit, the United States has bor-
rowed dollars from foreign creditors. Last year alone, the nation bor-
rowed $100 billion from the rest of the world.9 By the end of 1987, the
United States owed foreign creditors $400 billion-more than the com-
bined debt of all the third world debtor nations. 10 By the mid 1990s,
the total U.S. foreign debt could approach $1 trillion. '1 In seven short
years, the United States has gone from being the world's largest creditor
nation to being the world's largest debtor nation. 12
2. See Thurow & Tyson, The Economic Black Hole, 67 FOREIGN POL'Y 1-4 (1987);
Choate & Lynger, Tailored Trade: Dealing with the World As It Is, HARV. Bus. REV. 86-88
(an./Feb. 1988).
3. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, COMPETING IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 1 (1987). OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, Paying the Bill: Manufactur-
ers and the U.S. Trade Deficit, OTA ITE-390, at 1-8 (June, 1988) [hereinafter OTA].
4. OTA, supra note 3, at 9-16.
5. U.S. CONGRESS, 1988 JOINT ECONOMIC REPORT 16 (1988).
6. Id.
7. Thurow & Tyson, supra note 2, at 3-4.
8. See id. (If the U.S. had achieved a balanced trade position in 1986 it would
have employed approximately 4 million additional workers.)
9. OTA, supra note 3, at 1.
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Like all loans, the loans that the United States has used to finance its
imports must be repaid with interest. The annual interest payment on
the debt in the 1990s is likely to approach $100 billion.13 Each $40 bil-
lion in interest payments converts to about a 1% drop in the U.S. stan-
dard of living. 14 By the 1990s, interest payments could force the
American standard of living down by two to three percent-a very seri-
ous recession equivalent to that suffered during the Great Depression. 15
As the Office of Technology Assessment recently noted: "No nation,
not even one as rich as the United States, can go on forever paying for
its current account deficit with foreign capital. A time of reckoning will
come."
16
Even these dire macroeconomic figures do not fully illuminate the
problems that the United States has experienced in critical economic
sectors. The United States has lost its pre-eminence in such critical
manufacturing industries as semiconductor and consumer electronic
product manufacturing. In 1980, for example, the United States held
75% of the world semiconductor market. Japan held only about 25%.
By 1987, a dramatic reversal had occurred as the U.S. held only 25% of
the world semiconductor market while Japan held nearly 75 %. 1 7 The
problem has continued to spread. The United States is now being chal-
lenged in other areas that it previously dominated, such as the design
and manufacture of supercomputers. 18
B. Flawed U.S. Trade Strategy
No single element independently explains the rapid deterioration of the
U.S. trade position. An overvalued dollar, uneven world growth, and
unfair foreign trade practices all have contributed to the trade deficit.
The single largest reason why the United States has not been able to
deal with these problems is because the nation has fallen into the trap of
using yesterday's solutions to solve today's problems.
1. Reliance on Multilateralism
Nowhere is this problem more apparent than in our strategy toward
international trade negotiations. Since World War II, the United States
primarily has relied upon negotiations under the auspices of the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT") 19 to achieve its trade objec-
tives. Through the GATT, the United States has pressed fellow mem-
13. See Thurow & Tyson, supra note 2, at 5.
14. Id. (assuming a trade imbalance of $20 billion annually).
15. Id.
16. OTA, supra note 3, at 1.
17. C. PRESTOWrrZ, TRADING PLACES: How wE ALLOWEDJAPAN To TAKE THE LEAD
45 (1988).
18. See Leopold,Japanese Target U.S. Superfast Computers, Def. News, Aug. 29, 1988,
at 1, col. 1.
19. 61 Stat. (5), (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. For the current version
binding on the United States, see 4 BAsic INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 1
(1969) [hereinafter GATT].
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bers to agree upon trading rules that provide for the conduct of
international trade on a more or less free market basis. 20
The United States trade policy establishment has committed itself
firmly to the GATT. The conventional wisdom is that bilateral agree-
ments are, except in rare cases, at best ineffective, and at worst a serious
threat to GATT members' commitment to the multilateral process. 2'
This attitude is a large part of the trade problem.
2. Evaluating the GATT
The GATT served the United States during the period immediately fol-
lowing World War II. Following its creation in 1948, the GATT
reduced worldwide tariff levels and expanded world trade. 22 The
United States continues to emphasize the GATT today. The theoretical
attractiveness of multilateral agreements over bilateral agreements is
easy to grasp: the benefits of a multilateral agreement generally are
larger than the benefits of a bilateral agreement because a multilateral
agreement opens many markets while a bilateral agreement opens only
one.
2 3
For the last fifteen years, the GATT has been stumbling. As some
nations have lowered their tariffs, other nations have raised non-tariff
barriers, such as export subsidies and variable levies.24 The GATT has
not successfully addressed these non-tariff barriers. As progress in the
GATT has slowed to a crawl, the organization has lost credibility as the
policeman of world trade.
The failings of the GATT can be traced to its origins. The GATT
was created as an interim measure pending the creation of a real inter-
national organization to police world trade. Unfortunately, the "real"
international organization never came into existence, and the interim
measure became permanent. The GATT successfully lowered world-
wide tariff levels. 2 5 Unfortunately, it is an insufficient tool for regulating
today's more complicated international commerce.
The limited nature of the GATT underscores the need for alternate
trade policy tools. The GATT covers only about 7% of world com-
merce. 2 6 Major economic powers, such as the Soviet Union and China,
are not GATT members. Both of these nations have non-market econo-
mies that are fundamentally incompatible with the GATT's current
structure. Unless these nations restructure their economies or the
20. J. Baker, The Geopolitical Implications of the U.S.-Canada Trade Pact, INT'L ECON.
35, 36 (Jan./Feb., 1988). See also Choate & Lynger, supra note 2, at 86-88.
For a comprehensive history of the debate regarding the relative merits of bilater-
alism and multilateralism, see Diebold, The History and Issues in BILATERALISM AND
MULTILATERALISM AND CANADA IN U.S. TRADE POLICY 1-32 (Diebold ed. 1988).
21. Choate & Lynger, supra note 2, at 86-88.
22. D. BONKER, AMERICA'S TRADE CRISIS 188-207 (1988).
23. Diebold, supra note 20, at 172-81.
24. Baker, supra note 20, at 38.
25. Choate & Lynger, supra note 2, at 88.
26. Id.
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GATT members change the agreement, it is unlikely that non-market
economies will be accommodated. 27 Furthermore, the GATT does not
address capital flows, international investment, protection of intellectual
property, trade in services, exchange rates, and a myriad of other issues
related to international commerce. 28 Certain practices that clearly
restrict trade, such as Voluntary Restraint Agreements ("VRAs") and
variable levies, escape challenge under the GATT.29 Finally, the GATT
effectively excludes such large sectors of the merchandise trade as tex-
tiles and agricultural products.3 0
Even in the small sector of international commerce where it clearly
applies, the GATT has proven an ineffective policeman. In order to
convince nations to join the GATT, draftsmen have built a number of
dispute settlement safeguards into the process to ease fears about yield-
ing sovereignty to an international body. Once a trade practice is chal-
lenged under the GATT, consultations ensue between the parties. If, as
is usually the case, the consultations do not resolve the issue, a dispute
settlement panel must be formed to consider it. The nation challenged
under GATT can drag out the process of forming a panel. Even if an
aggrieved party obtains a panel ruling, any party to the GATT can block
acceptance of the ruling. Using these and other procedural safeguards,
a major power easily can derail the GATT dispute settlement proce-
dures. 3 ' Beyond that, even after the GATT has ruled, many nations
have for years refused to act.3 2
GATT dispute settlement procedures often take years, leading frus-
trated negotiators to dub the agreement "the Gentlemen's Agreement
to Talk and Talk." A 1987 General Accounting Office study of GATT
dispute settlement procedures reported that the average United States
complaint to the GATT took 45 months to resolve. 33 The infamous cit-
rus dispute between the United States and the European Community
dragged on for 12 years. 34 Understandably, many nations prefer to
resolve trade disputes bilaterally rather than involve the GATT.
Unless something radically changes the international environment,
little progress through the GATT is likely in the foreseeable future.
Since its inception, the GATT membership has grown from 23 to 94
27. Id. at 87-90.
28. Id. at 88.
29. Baker, supra note 20, at 38.
30. See Choate and Lynger, supra note 2, at 88.
31. For a thorough description of the GATT dispute settlement procedures, see
THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
TRADE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE GATT AND TOKYO ROUND AGREEMENTS,
USITC PUBLICATION 1793 (Dec. 1985).
32. Choate & Lynger, supra note 2, at 88.
33. GAO REPORT, GAO PUBLICATION No. N.SIAD-87-100 (March, 1987). On
perceived problems in the GATT dispute settlement procedures, see THE U.S. INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, The Multifiber Arrangement, 1980-84, USITC Publi-
cation 1693 I-4 (May 1985).
34. Choate & Lynger, supra note 2, at 88.
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nations.3 5 In theory, expanded membership initially may be viewed as
positive because the potential exists for eliminating more trade barriers.
In practice, expanded membership has meant that progress in the
GATT has slowed to a crawl. Each new nation has its own agenda and
particular areas in which it will resist GATT discipline. As more nations
have joined the GATT, the barriers to progress have grown proportion-
ally. The first few rounds of GATT negotiations took less than a year
each. The latest round-the Tokyo round-lasted six years.
3 6
3. Uruguay Round Prospects
Many hope that the GATT's problems could be addressed in the current
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. The United States has unveiled
an aggressive GATT agenda that includes expanding the GATT to cover
services, agriculture, investment, and intellectual property, as well as
streamlining dispute settlement. 3 7 Despite this initiative, other nations
appear ready to block efforts to further liberalize international trade.
The European Community ("EC")-an advocate of the GAT in the
past-now seems more interested in internal market liberalization
through the "Europe 1992-38 talks and is less concerned with multilat-
eral market opening through the GATT. The EC also is unwilling to
impose significant discipline on agricultural trade. 39 Although it may
have more to gain from a successful GATT round than any other nation,
Japan has never been an enthusiastic participant in GATT negotiations.
Some of the newly industrialized countries ("NICs"), such as Korea,
would rather pursue mercantilist policies on the Japanese model than
submit to GATT restrictions. Finally, a number of the developing
nations, Brazil and India in particular, would prefer to avoid further
GATT discipline, especially protection of intellectual property and trade
in services. 40
Only the United States and a few of its closest allies appeared truly
committed to progress through the Uruguay Round. Even within the
United States, there are reasons to doubt the existence of the domestic
consensus necessary to win approval of the current GATT agenda, espe-
cially in the area of agricultural products.4 1
35. Id. at 86.
36. Id. at 88.
37. D. BONKER, supra note 22, at 202.
38. "Europe 1992" is used to describe the new EC initiative to create a true com-
mon market and turn Europe into an economic superpower. For a good history, see
Yemma, Setting Sights Boldly on Unity, Christian Sci. Monitor, June 27, 1988, at 1, col.
1. This article is the first in a four-part series discussing Europe 1992. Part Four was
published onJune 30, 1988, and discussed the U.S.-Japanese reaction to the EC initi-
ative. See U.S. and Japan Size Up New Kid on the Block, Christian Sci. Monitor, June 30,
1988, at 1, col. 1.
39. D. BONKER, supra note 22, at 202. See also UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTA-
TIVE, URUGUAY ROUND UPDATE 4 (Sept. 1988) (copy on file at the office of the Cornell
International Law Journal).
40. See UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 39, at 8.
41. See id. at 4.
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The fundamental problem is that the United States no longer has
the unquestioned economic and political dominance required to force
the rest of the world to play by its rules. Commitment by the United
States may have been enough to move the GATT after World War II,
but the United States no longer has the necessary power. Intransigence
on the part of even one major trading partner can cripple the GATT
negotiations.4 2
American attempts to wield influence are further complicated by the
fact that other major trading nations (especially Japan, Korea, and the
larger developing nations) do not share the United States' commitment
to the market principles enshrined in the GATT. Export driven econo-
mies on the Japanese and Korean model simply are not market econo-
mies in the sense that the United States has used the term. In fact, there
are relatively few true market economies in the world.43 Nations with
different economic systems are increasingly unwilling to have American
free market principles imposed upon them through the GATT.
II. The Bilateral Alternatives
A. Escaping the GATT Mindset
Despite the signs of failure all around, many in the trade establishment
are unwilling to look for alternatives to the multilateral approach. In
fact, new approaches like the FTA almost invariably have been criticized
as undermining the GATT process. As Pat Choate of TRW, Inc.
recently wrote:
While multilateral talks drag on, the United States misses opportunities
for international economic cooperation and trade expansion. The new
reality is that a multilateral world requires more options, both inside and
outside the GATT, than multilateral negotiations provide.... Indeed,
the GATT's inability to change has made the agreement not merely an
obstacle, but a threat to expanded world trade.4 4
The United States should not abandon the GATT. There are still
issues that the GATT can address effectively. The United States cannot
expect much progress, however, unless it gives other nations an incen-
tive to negotiate. Certainly, we no longer can afford to rely on the
GATT as heavily as we have since World War II. Times have changed;
the U.S. must forge a new strategy.
B. Advantages of Bilateral Agreements
While multilateral agreements theoretically may be preferable to bilat-
eral agreements, bilateral agreements have several practical advantages.
First, the old rule of thumb that "the fewer parties at the table the faster
42. At the recent Toronto Economic Summit, America's allies rebuffed several
American initiatives. See generally Kilborn, U.S. to Give Poor Lands More Time to Pay
Debts, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1988, at A8, col. 1.
43. Choate & Lynger, supra note 2, at 86-93.
44. Id. at 86.
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the negotiations" is particularly applicable in international trade negoti-
ations. As the FTA negotiations demonstrate, significant progress can
be made in a relatively short time. The Canada FTA negotiations took
about 16 months while the last GATT round took six years.
45
Second, bilateral agreements provide a more flexible forum for
addressing economic problems. As the current GATT round demon-
strates, developing and developed nations have very different economic
problems and interests. For example, many of the developing nations
have been unwilling even to discuss further protection of intellectual
property. As the FTA demonstrates, however, a bilateral forum allows
the parties to address broader issues that are very difficult to address in
the multilateral GATT negotiations. Trade in services and investment
are examples of such problems. The United States can use bilateral
agreements to address a myriad of problems ranging from exchange
rate fluctuation to inadequate distribution systems that probably are
beyond the current scope of the GATT.
Perhaps the major advantage of bilateral agreements is that success
is possible. Bilateral negotiations give the United States an option of
avoiding the multilateral deadlock. Nations that are unwilling to negoti-
ate will no longer frustrate American objectives. With bilateral negotia-
tion as a viable alternative, the United States can sidestep States that
refuse to negotiate seriously in the GATT.
C. Japan as a Bilateral Target
Besides Canada, other major trading partners present opportunities for
new bilateral agreements. Japan is a particularly attractive target.
1. Japan as an Economic Superpower
Economic realities bolster the case for a bilateral trade and economic
agreement with Japan. The United States and Japan are the two largest
economies in the free world. 4 6 They have the largest bilateral trade
relationship between major countries. 4 7 America is Japan's largest trad-
ing partner, and Japan is the United States' second largest trading part-
ner (after Canada). 48 Japan is the largest source of foreign investment
in the U.S., and Japan is the United States' largest creditor.49
Japan has joined the United States as the world's second financial
superpower. Tokyo and New York are the world's two largest financial
centers. Increasingly, Tokyo is the place that the world goes for capi-
45. Baker, supra note 20, at 41; C. AHO & A. ARONSON, TRADE TALKS: AMERICA
BETrER LISTEN! 19 (1985).
46. See MorseJapan's Drive to Pre-eminence, 69 FOREIGN POL'y 3 (Winter 1987-88).
47. Id. See also Bergsten, Economic Imbalances, 65 FOREIGN AFF. 770, 789-90 (1987)
($115 billion annually).
48. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
791 (1985).
49. OTA, supra note 3, at 9-11.
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tal. 50 The dollar and the yen are the world's two largest currencies.
The yen's value has risen remarkably. In 1980, 66.5% of international
bond issues were denominated in U.S. dollars, 17.5% in Deutsche
marks, and only 1.5% in yen. By 1987, there had been a dramatic shift:
35.8%o were in U.S. dollars, 8.1% in Deutsche marks, and 14.1% in
yen.5 1
2. Japanese Trade Barriers
Japan plays an important role in the United States' international eco-
nomic problems. The problems are most apparent on the trade front.
Between 1980 and 1986, United States-Japan trade had grown from $54
billion to $115 billion. 52 Of the $61 billion increase, rising Japanese
exports to the United States had accounted for $53 billion.53 Increased
United States exports to Japan had accounted for only about $8 bil-
lion.54 More than one third of the $60 billion United States trade deficit
is with Japan. The American bilateral deficit with Japan is more than
three times as large as the bilateral deficit with any other nation.5 5 Per-
haps most troubling is the persistence of the trade imbalance with the
United States. Despite wide fluctuations in exchange rates and other
economic factors, the United States has run a trade deficit withJapan for
more than 20 years.5 6
A recent World Bank study indicated thatJapan maintains the most
heavily protected market of any nation in the developed world, with
nearly twice as many barriers as the United States.5 7 The ratio of manu-
factured imports to GNP forJapan has remained close to 2% for the last
20 years; in other industrialized nations that ratio is higher and contin-
ues to rise.58
The most important barriers in the Japanese marketplace are
largely cultural. The network of personal ties between Japanese busi-
nesses together with the Japanese distribution system have combined to
create formidable barriers to the Japanese market. As American soft
drink exporters have found, a superior product at a lower price is not
always enough to penetrate the Japanese business network. Personal
relationships between Japanese businessmen create a strong preference
to "buy Japanese," a significant barrier to United States exporters with
designs on the Japanese market. Because it is merely a matter ofJapa-
50. See Kido, International Use of the Yen Seen Increasing Steadily, Japan Econ. J., May
14, 1988, at 1, col. 5.
51. Id.
52. Morse, supra note 46, at 20.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. OTA, supra note 3, at 3.
56. Stokes, Living With a New Japan, 11 NAT'LJ. 657-61 (1988).
57. WORLD BANK, 1987 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, BARRIERS TO ADJUSTMENT
AND GROWTH, IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, INDUSTRIALIZATION AND FOREIGN TRADE,
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 142 (1987).
58. THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, JAPAN,
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS 40 (1985).
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nese businessmen preferring to buy from other Japanese businessmen,
not a government policy, this problem is difficult to address either
through the GATT or American trade law.5 9
In addition to the "buyJapanese" bias, the multi-layer Japanese dis-
tribution system of small middlemen and retail outlets also has served as
a barrier between the exporter and the Japanese consumer. 60 Even if
exporters successfully penetrate the distribution system, the price of
their products may rise as much as 300% as they pass through the distri-
bution layers to the Japanese consumers.
61
Some argue that Japan is always likely to run a trade surplus with
industrialized nations because it must export manufactured goods on a
massive scale in order to pay for the imported energy and raw materials
that it cannot produce domestically. Although Japan is dependent upon
foreign sources for energy, food and raw materials, the Japanese trade
surplus with developed nations has offset this dramatically. Last year
the Japanese trade surplus with the world was $80 billion.62 It has
grown so large that the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development recently urged Japan to reduce the surplus because it
threatened the world economy. 63
3. Other Economic Problems
Japan's closed market also has affected lesser developed countries
("LDCs"). Over the last decade, the United States has absorbed more
than 60% of LDC exports. Japan has taken only about 5%. The closed
Japanese markets have deprived LDCs of needed export
opportunities. 64
The problems do not end on the trade front. The dollar and the
yen have been on a tremendous roller-coaster ride. In 1980, the
yen/dollar exchange rate stood at 200:1. In February 1985, the
exchange rate had peaked at 262:1.65 By February of 1988, the dollar
had plunged to approximately 125 yen to the dollar-a 55% deprecia-
tion. 66 When exchange rates fluctuate, the price of exports and imports
also fluctuate. If the dollar appreciates 50%, the price of American
exports increases by 50%. Wild swings in the yen/dollar exchange rate
59. See Fallows, Japan: Playing by Different Rules, ATLANTic MONTHLY 22, 24-28
(Sept. 1987).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 26-27. See Gephardt, Trade: The Establishment's Game, Wash. Post, Jan.
25, 1988, at A19.
62. United Nations, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs,
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Nov. 1988, at 96.
63. New OECD Study released Aug. 28, 1988. Complete citation not yet
available.
64. Robinson, For A Japanese Equivalent of the Marshall Plan, N.Y. Times, May 3,
1986, § 1, at 27.
65. Gilpin, The Dollar's Wild Ride, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1988, § 3, at 7.
66. Another Low for Dollar, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1988, at D3, col. 6. In Tokyo, the
dollar opened trading against the yen on Jan. 4, 1988 at 120.45:1.
Vol 22
1989 New Trade Strategy
have exacerbated trade imbalances and devastated export industries in
both countries.
The world's two economic superpowers have failed to coordinate
economic policies. In the mid-1980s, the United States had pursued an
expansionary economic policy founded on a tax cut and deficit spend-
ing. At the same time Japan took the opposite economic tack. Failure to
coordinate greatly inflated the trade imbalance. As the overstimulated
United States economy had drawn in imports and had borrowed the dol-
lars from Japan to pay for them, both the trade imbalance and United
States debtor status ballooned.6 7
Other underlying differences between American and Japanese eco-
nomic habits militate against expanding trade. Japanese consumer
spending has lagged behind that of similarly situated developed econo-
mies because ofJapan's high savings rate and very high food and hous-
ing costs. 68 The average Japanese consumer lives in a house about one-
half the size of his American counterpart and spends three times as
much on food.69 If Japan could ease the combined burden of saving,
food, and housing, a tremendous burst of consumer demand could be
released. This new domestic demand could cut the Japanese trade sur-
plus by increasing imports and absorbing a larger share of Japanese
production.
4. Disproportionate Defense Spending
Beyond these purely economic problems is the issue of burden sharing.
Though both nations obviously benefit from western security spending,
the financial burden continues to fall disproportionately on the United
States. The United States currently spends about seven percent of its
GNP on security while Japan spends only about one percent. 70 There is
a growing consensus within the United States that the disproportionate
burden of defense spending on the American economy has hindered the
nation's competitiveness in international markets. Simply put, the dol-
lars spent on defense have contributed to United States macroeconomic
ills and cannot be reinvested in the economy.
Japan has attempted to ease this imbalance by increasing its contri-
bution to American forces stationed in Japan, committing resources to
keeping the Persian Gulf open, and increasing foreign assistance. The
combined impact of these steps on the overall balance of security spend-
ing nevertheless is minimal.7 1 The U.S. andJapan must consider impor-
tant foreign policy questions before Japan can take further steps toward
67. Forget the Growl, Look at the Tails, ECONOMIST at 18 (Jan. 9, 1988). A. ROMBERG,
U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS: A PARTNERSHIP IN SEARCH OF DEFINITION 10 (1988).
68. Fallows, supra note 59, at 26-27. ECONOMIST, supra note 67, at 18.
69. See Bergsten, supra note 47, at 782; Fallows, supra note 59, at 26-27; Packard,
The Coming U.S.-Japan Crisis, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 348, 359 (Winter, 1987-88).
70. Hepstone, A Barrier Finally Crossed in Japan, Wash. Times, Jan. 17, 1987, at 3E.
71. See Japan's Foreign Aid Policy: 1987 Update, 41 A JAPAN ECONOMIC INSTITUTE
REPORT 1 (Oct. 30, 1987).
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assuming its share of the defense burden. If the United States andJapan
are to compete on equal footing, however, they must address this
problem.
5. Failure of the Current Ad Hoc Approach
In the face of a battery of significant problems, the United States and
Japan have yet to devise a coherent strategy to address their mutual eco-
nomic concerns. The Reagan Administration attempted to address most
of its problems with Japan-including the trade imbalance, the value of
the yen, and Japanese security spending-through ad hoc, bilateral
negotiations. This strategy has three serious flaws. First, it is poorly
focused. Considerable time and political capital is spent on issues of
little economic import.7 2 Second, the ad hoc, issue by issue approach
creates the impression in Japan that the United States is a perpetual
complainer. Public opinion in Japan has swung against the United
States. 73 This loss of goodwill substantially decreases American lever-
age with Japan on the larger, underlying issues.
Finally, the United States has failed to establish a central agenda for
its negotiations with Japan. Each agency negotiates with Japan on its
own, with little central control. George Packard, Dean of the School of
Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, explained
the Japanese response to the ad hoc approach of the United States:
"Japanese negotiators have learned to wait patiently until today's issue
gives way to tomorrow's. They cannot be blamed for failing to under-
stand or act upon American priorities, for no one can say at any moment
what these priorities are." 74
In short, the bilateral economic problems have grown too large for
multilateral negotiations. The current approach of ad hoc bilateral
negotiations to address United States concerns has failed. The time has
come for a more ambitious, better conceived trade policy. 75
D. A U.S.-Japan Economic Accord
The time is ripe for a major bilateral accord between the United States
and Japan. This agreement should address three major issues: the
72. 134 CONG. REc. S1082 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1988) (statement of Sen. Baucus). I
first discussed this concept in a speech to the Tokyo Press Club in March, 1988.
73. See Haberman,Japanese Favor a Global Role A Survey Finds, N.Y. Times, May 3,
1988, at 1, col. I.
74. Packard, supra note 69, at 362.
75. Commenting on the need for a new U.S. approach, former Secretaries of
State Kissinger and Vance recently wrote:
We consider it essential that the dialogue with Japan be lifted to a more com-
prehensive level. Japan will be one of the major powers of the 21 st century.
We are becoming more and more interdependent. The issue is how to deal
with the consequences of interdependency, not how to reverse or change the
relationship.
Kissinger & Vance, Bipartisan Objectives ofAmerican Foreign Policy, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 913
(1988).
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trade problem, economic coordination, and burden sharing. 76
1. A New Approach to the Trade Dispute
Advocates of a full-fledged free trade agreement with Japan rightly have
identified the major problem with the current United States strategy. As
Ambassador Mansfield stated it, the current approach of "nickeling and
diming" Japan to death has created more problems than it has solved. 77
But a free trade agreement on the Canada model may not be the best
approach in the case ofJapan. Given the subtlety and pervasiveness of
the trade barriers that American exporters encounter in Japan, a free
trade agreement is unlikely to best serve the United States' interests.
The immediate goal should be an agreement that expands trade and
addresses our major economic problems. After such an arrangement
has been in place for a number of years, a more traditional free trade
agreement would be far easier to achieve.
2. Macroeconomic Coordination
Instead of focusing on trade barriers and tariffs, an agreement with
Japan should focus on overall trade flows. The United States andJapan
need a macroeconomic coordination agreement that uses trade flows as
an indicator, rather than a trade agreement in the traditional sense.
Both nations should set trade flow targets that demand both increased
trade and control of trade imbalances. The targets could use either
worldwide or bilateral trade flows and balances as the basic benchmark.
The targets should provide that a minimum fixed percentage of exports
to Japan be high technology and manufactured goods. This approach is
appropriate because these products are at the heart of the U.S.-Japan
trade problem and Japan has been least willing to import these
products.
The agreement should obligate both nations to use macroeconomic
policy to meet the targets. Since the agreement's focus is on expanding
trade, it should discourage, if not forbid altogether, trade-limiting policy
tools such as voluntary restraint agreements. Such an approach to the
trade deficit problem is far more direct than the current ad hoc, bilateral
negotiations or the GAIT. It recognizes the urgency of the trade prob-
lem and directly addresses the trade imbalance, yet it does not force
Japan to restructure its economy to American specifications.
The recent devaluation of the dollar and our experience with the G-
5 demonstrate the potential for successful macroeconomic coordination.
Both governments can greatly change trade flow patterns by controlling
exchange rates and relative rates of growth.78 Moreover, as the Japa-
76. See Baucus, supra note 72.
77. Cited in Preeg, Next a Free Trade Pact With Japan?, Wall St.J., Aug. 12, 1988, at
12, col. 4.
78. SeeJ. WILLIAMSON & M. MILLER, TARGETS AND INDICATORS: A BLUEPRINT FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC POLICY (1987); S. MARRIS, DEFICITS
AND THE DOLLAR REvISITED (1987). For a definition of G-5, see infra note 112.
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nese economic miracle demonstrates, government programs to
encourage trade on the individual business level can have tremendous
long-term impact.
The pressure to meet the trade targets would be beneficial to both
economies. The targets would encourage Japan to make progress on
some of its more fundamental problems. If Japan commits itself to
meeting the targets, reform of the distribution system or increasing con-
sumer demand likely would be more attractive options than permanently
keeping the yen high or engaging in deficit spending. Japan, neverthe-
less, would have the flexibility of meeting the targets with the economic
tools of its choice instead of having the United States dictate guidelines.
The opportunities that open as a result of such an agreement also would
encourage American businesses and the federal government to become
more export oriented.
In addition to the targets, the United States and Japan should
attempt to resolve some of their most persistent trade problems, such as
the problem of recidivist dumping79 and the low penetration of LDC
exports into the Japanese market.8 0 Both nations should agree to closer
policing of recidivist dumpers, and Japan should assent to an LDC
import preference similar to the Caribbean Basin Initiative or take other
steps to encourage LDC imports. A new dispute settlement mecha-
nism-perhaps modelled on the general dispute settlement mechanism
of the FTA-should be established to apply the agreed upon rules and
address future disputes in a structured forum.
3. A Kind of G-2
One of the most useful functions that such a bilateral agreement could
serve would be establishing a framework for closer economic coordina-
tion between the United States and Japan-a kind of G-2. 8 1 As the
world's two largest economies, the United States and Japan are in a
strong position to exercise leadership in the world economy. As C. Fred
Bergsten, the Director of the International Institute of Economics
recently wrote: "[T]here is a strong rationale for constructing a G-2 and
using it as the primary if informal tool for seeking to exercise leadership
of the world economy." '82
As part of a broad economic accord, a G-2 arrangement could allow
the United States and Japan to address two fundamental economic
problems: fluctuating exchange rates and uneven world growth. The
two countries could establish exchange rate target zones to prevent the
wild fluctuations in the yen/dollar exchange rate witnessed over the last
79. C. PREsTowrrz, supra note 17, at 38. Dumping is defined as the practice of
selling below cost or below the price at home in foreign markets. Recidivist dumping
is the habitual practice of dumping goods on foreign markets.
80. Robinson, supra note 64 ("Currently, the United States absorbs 65 percent of
[LCD] imports while Japan takes only 7 percent.").
81. The term G-2 is used in Bergsten, supra note 47, at 789.
82. Id. at 791-92.
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decade. Such a step could prevent exchange rate distortions from
affecting trade imbalances. The two nations also could coordinate eco-
nomic policies to ensure that they do not repeat the mistakes of the mid-
1980s. The Reagan Administration took the first step toward such an
arrangement in the Baker-Miyazawa Accord of 1986 which provided for
considerable economic coordination between the United States and
Japan. 8 3 A fully functioning G-2 would likely have kept the U.S.-Japan
trade imbalance from reaching its current crisis proportions and would
have allowed both economies healthier, managed growth.
A G-2 could lead the rest of the world by example and necessity into
further multilateral economic coordination. Certainly, involving other
nations in economic coordination would increase its effectiveness. From
a practical viewpoint, however, the logistical problems of accommodat-
ing the trade agendas of many nations slow results and weaken the
mechanism. It is the old principle of too many cooks spoiling the broth.
The formulation used in the Baker-Miyazawa Accord for inviting other
nations to participate in such an arrangement after it has been estab-
lished has merit.8 4 As a practical matter, once a U.S.-Japan G-2 begins
to function, other nations would face the choice ofjoining the process or
allowing the United States and Japan to dictate world economic condi-
tions. As long as the United States andJapan make it clear that they will
not allow new members to bog down either decision-making or imple-
mentation, wider participation would result in a more efficiently man-
aged world economy.
4. Burden Sharing
The final prong of the U.S.-Japan Accord should address the problem of
burden sharing. Perhaps the most vexing aspect of the U.S.-Japan eco-
nomic equation is the problem of the unequal security burden. The
obvious solution to the problem-increasing Japanese military spend-
ing-raises serious concerns both inside and outside Japan. Within
Japan, the very active peace movement likely will block a Japanese mili-
tary buildup. Externally, memories of World War II are still too vivid in
Korea, the Philippines, and China.8 5 Until the United States and Japan
address this underlying disparity, however, the United States will remain
at a relative economic disadvantage to Japan.
The best approach to this problem is to encourage Japan to
increase direct payments to the United States and to increase its foreign
assistance, preferably through multilateral agencies. Japan has been
83. See id. at 789. The Baker-Miyazawa Accord was an agreement between the
United States and Japan to coordinate and bolster both nations' economies. The
accord, concluded Oct. 31, 1986 by United States Treasury Secretary James Baker
andJapanese Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, required Japan to stimulate its econ-
omy and the United States to refrain from attempting to lower the then high value of
the dollar. U.S. and Japan Vow to Cooperate in Economic Moves, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1,
1986, at I, col. 6.
84. See Bergsten, supra note 47, at 792.
85. See, Morse, supra note 46, at 18.
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increasing its supplement to American military spending by assuming a
larger portion of the cost of maintaining United States military forces in
Japan and the surrounding region. s 6 The option of increased Japanese
contributions to support American military spending is popular in the
United States, but is not likely to be well received in Japan where such
payments might be viewed as tribute to the United States. It is, how-
ever, one of the most attractive options available. Payments address the
unequal defense burden, without raising significant foreign policy
problems in East Asia.
Increasing Japanese foreign assistance to make up for low defense
spending is likely to be more palatable injapan. Several prominentJap-
anese authorities have suggested increased foreign assistance as a way of
balancing the security burden without rearming.8 7 This idea appears to
have taken root; Japan steadily is increasing foreign assistance. Accord-
ing to Prime Minister Takeshita, Japan currently plans to expand foreign
assistance significantly in the coming years.88
Japan, however, must go even further. For example, as part of an
economic accord, Japan might agree to spend some of its current
account surplus on foreign assistance to solve the Latin American debt
crisis. Such a program would address a significant international eco-
nomic problem in the process of redistributing the world security bur-
den. Jim Robinson, CEO of American Express, observed that:
As the free world's second largest economy, and largest creditor, Japan
could take the lead by investing in the economic elements of global secur-
ity.... Today's missing element in free world security is the additional
economic contribution thatJapan and others with chronic balance of pay-
ment surpluses might make . . . such an initiative would clearly be in
Japan's self interest. It could help dampen anti-Japanese sentiment and
protectionism, and would signal that Japan is assuming the leadership
role so amply justified by its dynamic energy. Joined and supported by
other industrial democracies, the Tokyo plan could become a program as
sweeping in its economic benefits and as memorable as the Marshall
plan.8 9
E. Benefits of a U.S.-Japan Accord
An accord like the one outlined in this Article is overwhelmingly in the
interest of both the United States andJapan. Both nations unquestiona-
bly will benefit from a healthier bilateral economic and political relation-
ship. In their analysis of the changing economic relationship between
the United States and Japan, many observers believe that Japan increas-
86. See Hepstone, supra note 70; Romberg, supra note 67, at 13; ECONOMIST, supra
note 67, at 19-20.
87. Romberg, supra note 67, at 23.
88. Significant Increase Slated for Tokyo's Aid Budget, lB JAPAN ECONOMIC INsTITrrE
REPORT 7 (Jan. 8, 1988).
89. Robinson, supra note 64.
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ingly has the upper hand in the American-Japanese relationship. 90 This
is a superficial assessment of the situation. The reality is that the United
States and Japan are increasingly interdependent; each relies upon the
other. Japan relies upon the United States as a market for 40% of its
exports, 9 I and America is the ultimate guarantor of Japanese security.
The United States also relies on Japan. It now owes Japan $250 billion
and borrows from Japan almost daily to support its budget deficit.9 2
Given this tremendous interdependency, a recession in one country
likely will drag the other down. In short, both nations have a substantial
stake in mutual economic prosperity. An agreement that eliminates
some of the fundamental threats to that economic relationship serves
the interests of both nations.
Beyond direct economic benefits, a U.S.-Japan accord also provides
certain strategic benefits. There is great concern in both nations now
about the Europe 1992 project now underway in the EC. Informed
observers in both nations fear that a more closely knit internal EC mar-
ket will result in higher external trade barriers against the rest of the
world. Increased European competition could cause hard pressed Euro-
pean businesses to clamor for protection from the United States and
Japan.9 3 Bilateral talks between the United States and Japan aimed at
concluding a sweeping economic accord would be a powerful counter to
Europe 1992. If the United States and Japan were moving toward a
closer bilateral economic relationship, both would have more leverage
to prevent the EC from shutting them out. Continuing negotiations
would serve notice to the EC that other nations are capable of closer
economic union.
F. Other Bilateral Candidates
The possibilities for new United States bilateral economic and trade
agreements do not end with Japan. A number of other nations, includ-
ing Mexico, Korea, Taiwan, Australia, and New Zealand, are possible
candidates for a bilateral trade agreement. The case for Mexico seems
particularly compelling. As with Canada, the United States has a long
border with Mexico and substantial bilateral trade. The United States
has a substantial direct stake in the economic health of Mexico because
of the growing illegal immigration problem. Given the economic dispar-
90. See Van Wolfren, The Japan Problem, 65 FOREIGN AFF. 288 (1986-87) (arguing
the U.S. must take measures to stave off serious economic conflict with Japan).
91. E. REISCHAUER, THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN IN 1986: CAN THE PARTNER-
SHIP WORK? 10 (1986).
92. Id. OTA, supra note 3, at 12-13.
93. As Robert Hormatz recently wrote:
Will European companies that become exposed to greater competition
because of lower barriers in Europe try to block lower barriers vis-a-vis the
rest of the world to protect themselves from intensified American and Asian
competition? ... there is a risk nonetheless that intra-European deals will be
made in important sectors and that regulations will be written to the advan-
tage of European companies at the expense of foreign trading partners.
Hormatz, A "Fortress Europe" in 1992?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1988, at A19.
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ities between the United States and Mexico, a U.S.-Mexico bilateral
agreement would confront certain problems not raised in the U.S.-Can-
ada FTA. A bilateral trade agreement with Mexico appears to have
merit.
9 4
Although less work has been done on the other possible bilateral
targets, a case can be made for several potential accords. Some of the
ASEAN nations have expressed interest in a free trade arrangement with
the United States.9 5 While there are significant problems with conclud-
ing an FTA with a developing nation, particularly a major textile pro-
ducer, some form of bilateral agreement may be in America's interest.
Australia and New Zealand represent another potential trade accord tar-
get. The two countries already maintain a bilateral free trade zone.96
Though the United States would have to address some thorny issues, an
agreement modeled after the Canada FTA may be possible with Austra-
lia or New Zealand.
1I. The Relationship Between Bilateral Agreements and Multilateral
Agreements
A. Historical Coexistence of Multilateral and Bilateral Agreements
Though critics of bilateral agreements argue that all bilateral agree-
ments necessarily undermine the GATT, this simply is not the case.
From the beginning, the GATT coexisted with various bilateral and
plurilateral trade and economic arrangements. 97 The United States is
party to several such arrangements, including the U.S.-Israel Free Trade
Agreement, 98 the U.S.-Canada Auto Pact, 99 the Caribbean Basin Initia-
tive, 10 0 and, of course, the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement.
Other nations also maintain extensive bilateral and plurilateral trad-
ing arrangements. Two of the most prominent are the EC and ASEAN,
but there are others. Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Finland, Austria, and
Switzerland make up the European Free Trade Area ("EFTA"), which
eliminated all tariffs on industrial products. The EFTA also maintains
an industrial free trade area with the EC.10 l Australia and New Zealand
94. See generally THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE IMPACT OF
INCREASED U.S.-MEXIcO TRADE ON SOUTHWEST BORDER DEVELOPMENT, USITC PUBLI-
CATION No. 1915, Nov., 1986.
95. ASEAN, the Association of South-East Asian Nations, includes Brunei, Indo-
nesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
96. Australia and New Zealand Sign Precedent Selling Free Trade Agreement, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE 3, Aug. 14, 1988.
97. See Baker, supra note 20, at 38.
98. Israel-United States Free Trade Area Agreement, H.R. Doc. No. 66, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 653.
99. U.S.-Canada Auto Pact, 80 Stat. 271, T.I.A.S. No. 6093 (Jan. 16, 1965).
100. See Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97
Stat. 384 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles 19, 26 and 33 of the
United States Code).
101. Response by the United States Trade Representative to Questions Posed by
Chairman Bentsen of the Senate Finance Committee, Question 6: Response (1988)
(copy on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
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have a Trade Agreement on Closer Economic Relations ("ANZCERT")
which eliminates trade barriers on most goods and recently has been
extended to cover some services. 10 2 In short, special bilateral and pluri-
lateral trading arrangements are extremely common.
B. Preferential Agreements and the GATT
The principle of Most-Favored Nation Treatment for all GATT mem-
bers is central to the GATT. Nevertheless, there are many excep-
tions.10 3 Article XXIV explicitly allows for the formation of customs
unions and free trade zones. 10 4 The GATT includes this exception
because it was recognized from the outset that member nations would
want to establish certain preferential trade and economic relationships
and that such relationships promote international trade.
The GATT in Article XXIV does place two major requirements on
special customs unions. First, they must facilitate trade between the par-
ticipating states without raising barriers to trade with other nations.
Second, they must cover all or substantially all trade.' 0 5 Article XXIV's
102. Id. Other bilateral and plurilateral trading agreements include: Jamaica, Bar-
bados, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Belize, and the Caribbean Commonwealth
countries and territories which form the Caribbean Community and Common Market
(CARICOM); Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua make up the Cen-
tral American Common Market, Honduras, Panama, and the Dominican Republic
have partial membership. Canada maintains a CBI-like arrangement with Caribbean
Commonwealth. The EEC maintains a number of preferential relationships with for-
mer colonies. There are also a number of other minor arrangements, such as the
Latin American Integration Association, the Arab Common Market, South Africa's
preferential trading arrangement with several of its neighbors, and Finland's
arrangements with Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia.
103. Id.
104. Part III, art. XXIV, § 4 provides in pertinent part:
The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of
trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integra-
tion between the economies of the countries parties to such agreements.
They also recognize that the purpose of a customs union or a free-trade area
should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to
raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such territories.
GATT, supra note 19.
105. Part III, art. XXIV, § 5 provides:
Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as
between the territories of the contracting parties, the formation of a customs
union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement neces-
sary for the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area; Provided
that:
(a) with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to the
formation of a customs union, the duties and other regulations of commerce
imposed at the institution of any such union or interim agreement in respect
of trade with contracting parties not parties to such union or agreement shall
not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of
the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territo-
ries prior to the formation of such union or the adoption of such interim
agreement, as the case may be;
(b) with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the
formation of a free-trade area, the duties and other regulations of commerce
maintained in each of the constituent territories and applicable at the forma-
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requirement that special customs unions cover all or substantially all
trade represents the major legal barrier to future bilateral trade agree-
ments. There is precedent, however, for applying the principle
loosely. 10 6 Most of the major free trade areas, including the U.S.-Israel
Free Trade Agreement, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and very likely
the U.S.-Canada FTA, have been or will be reconciled with the GATT
through Article XXIV. 10 7 Parties should structure future agreements
creatively so as to conform to Article XXIV. For instance, most devel-
oped nations maintain relatively low tariff levels. One way to structure
creatively a bilateral agreement that conforms with the "substantially all
trade" requirement would be to incorporate an across-the-board tariff
cut into any bilateral accord.
Other trade arrangements that do not meet the Article XXIV test
(such as the U.S.-Canada Auto Pact and the European Steel and Coal
Community) have been reconciled with the GATT through a waiver.10 8
There are no formal requirements to obtain a waiver. Any arrangement
can be granted a waiver provided that two-thirds of the GATT con-
tracting parties vote in favor of extending it. There is always the possi-
bility that the GAIT contracting parties could reject a proposed waiver.
In the past, however, powerful nations have been able to obtain the
waivers they desire.' 0 9
In practice, the GATT may not present a significant barrier to
future bilaterals. The treaty is limited in scope. Many of the special
bilateral arrangements that the United States may wish to conclude deal
primarily or exclusively with subjects not covered by the GATT, such as
trade in services, investment and exchange rates. Since the GATT is
silent on these subjects, any agreement in these areas is beyond its
scope." 10 Even the bilateral trade targets suggested herein as part of the
bilateral agreement with Japan would not conflict with the GATT.
Those targets merely serve as economic indicators for coordinating
tion of such free-trade area or the adoption of such interim agreement to the
trade of contracting parties not included in such area or not parties to such
agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding
duties and other regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent
territories prior to the formation of the free-trade area, or interim agreement,
as the case may be; and
(c) any interim agreement referred to in sub-paragraph (a) and (b) shall
include a plan and schedule for the formation of such a customs union or of
such a free-trade area within a reasonable length of time.
Id.
106. The Caribbean Basin Initiative provides a good example. The Initiative cov-
ers a relatively small volume of the trade between the U.S. and the Caribbean Basin
nations, yet it has not been found to conflict with the GATT.
107. See Lowenfield, What the GAT Says (or Does Not Say), in BILATERALISM AND
MULTILATERALISM IN U.S. TRADE POLICY 59-60 (DIEBOLD ed. 1988).
108. Id. at 62-65.
109. Examples include the U.S. waiver to allow import restrictions on agricultural
products consistent with Section 22 of the Agriculture Adjustment Assistance Act
and the waiver granted for the U.S.-Canada Auto Pact.
110. On waivers, see generally, Lowenfield, supra n6te 107, at 57-65.
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macroeconomic policy; they would not require preferential tariff cuts or
other departures from the most favored nation principle. II' They are
no more inconsistent with the GATT, therefore, than economic coordi-
nation through the G-5 or the G-7.112
C. Bilateralism and Multilateralism are Complementary
Pursuing bilateral agreements actually increases the chances that the
United States will be able to achieve its trade objectives in the Uruguay
Round. Rather than draining interest from multilateral negotiations,
active bilateral negotiations will actually increase other nations' interest
in the GATT. Since the Uruguay Round is the only game in town, many
U.S. trading partners can now safely drag their feet. If it becomes
apparent that the United States is willing to pursue its trade and eco-
nomic interests bilaterally, however, a new message will be sent. Poten-
tial foot-draggers will realize that if they are unwilling to negotiate
through the GATT, the United States will conclude bilateral agreements
with other trade partners. Thus, active bilateral negotiations increase
the cost of stalling in the GATT and improve chances for an eventual
GATT agreement.' 1 3
Judging from the comments of our trading partners, the U.S.-Can-
ada FTA has served the United States well in this regard. Opening
negotiations with Japan would send a much stronger message. In other
words, bilateral negotiations with Japan are not only an attractive
approach to addressing United States economic problems with Japan,
but a very good way of reinvigorating the GATT.
Bilateral agreements also can pave the way for expanding the
GATT. For instance, the sections of the U.S.-Canada FTA that deal with
services and investment demonstrate that an agreement is possible in
those areas and provide at least a partial model for a future multilateral
111. A most favored nation clause, found in most treaties, provides "citizens or
subjects of the contracting nations may enjoy the privileges accorded by either party
to those of the most favored nation. The general design of such clauses is to estab-
lish the principle of equity of international treatment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 913
(5th ed. 1979).
112. The Group of 5 (G-5) is made up of the United States,Japan, West Germany,
Britain, and France. The Group of 7 (G-7) has the same members plus Canada and
Italy. Both are informal, ministerial level organizations designed to allow the major
economic powers to coordinate economic policy.
113. The Reagan Administration pursued this strategy on a limited scale. As for-
mer Treasury Secretary James Baker wrote in reference to the FTA:
The rewards of this agreement offer an incentive to other agreements. If
possible, we hope this follow-up liberalization will occur in the Uruguay
Round. If not, we might be willing to explore a 'market liberalization club'
approach, through minilateral agreements or a series of bilateral agreements.
In this fashion, North America can build steady momentum for more open
and efficient markets. [The United States Trade Representative] has
reported that there are voices in other nations-including Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan, and some of the nations of the ASEAN-that have indicated
that they do not wish to be left behind.
Baker, supra note 20, at 41.
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agreement.' 14 A similar case can be made for the treatment of services
in the Australia-New Zealand Agreement on Closer Economic Rela-
tions. 115 Along the same lines, if the United States and Japan agree to
police recidivist dumping more carefully, it would be easier for both
nations to later extend this courtesy to the rest of the world; a policing
mechanism would be in place and conceptual problems would have
been addressed.
By opening markets on a bilateral basis, otherwise insoluble polit-
ical problems can be attacked incrementally; bilateral agreements might
break the political ice for multilateral agreements. Once the first steps
have been taken to eliminate a trade barrier or solve an economic prob-
lem for one nation, political problems appear less formidable and it is
easier to reach similar agreements with other nations. For example,
opening the Japanese construction market to the entire world might be
extremely difficult politically for Japanese officials. Opening it only to
the United States might be somewhat easier. Once the market is opened
partially and the Japanese industry and government become accustomed
to the new situation, further liberalization will be easier to achieve. Far
from derailing the GATT, bilateral agreements can blaze a trail that the
GATT can follow.
Bilateral agreements also can provide significant benefits to third
parties. For example, a U.S.-Japan initiative that eliminates a large por-
tion of the trade deficit and strengthens the framework for international
economic coordination would ease pressure for protectionism within the
United States. Moreover, ifJapan agreed to further open its markets to
the third world or assist in debt relief, the entire world would benefit.
Finally, in today's interdependent world economy, healthy economic
growth in the world's two largest economies directly benefits the rest of
the world. The benefits from eliminating major trade and economic dis-
tortions will ripple around the globe.
IV. Strategy For A New President
Dr. Paul Kennedy recently wrote: "To be a great power-by definition,
a state capable of holding its own against any other nation-demands a
flourishing economic base."' "16 The next President should keep this
simple statement foremost in his mind as he sets policy priorities.
Given the gravity of the international economic problems that the
United States now faces, the next President must put trade and interna-
tional economic policy much higher on his agenda than past Presidents.
The world is changing; American wealth is increasingly dependent
on international economic policy. As the mounting trade deficit and
114. See id. at 40. See also Schott, Implications for the Uruguay Round, in THE CANADA-
U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE GLOBAL IMPACT 159-72 (J. Schott & M. Smith ed.
1988).
115. INSIDE U.S. TRADE, supra note 96, at 3.
116. See P. KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS 539 (1987).
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national debt demonstrate, the United States is no longer the world's
preeminent economic power. The gap between the United States econ-
omy and the economies of other major economic powers is closing
rapidly.
For the most part, past Presidents have let trade and international
economic policy take care of itself. These complex subjects lacked the
instant appeal of defense policy or arms control. The American econ-
omy and its businesses were strong enough to muddle through on their
own. For many years, the President was the only national leader to
attend international summits without his trade minister. The rest of the
world understood the message-America had other priorities.
Since there was little interest at the top, the formulation and execu-
tion of United States trade and international economic policy generally
has fallen to a few academic-oriented thinkers. There was and has been
a tendency among this group to put the GAIT at the center of United
States trade policy. While the GATT does have considerable theoretical
appeal, it cannot be the United States' only tool. The United States
must be willing to pursue its international economic interests through
bilateral and plurilateral agreements as well as through the GATT. The
United States no longer can afford an exclusively multilateral approach;
it can no longer rely on the old ways of doing things. Times have
changed, and American strategy must also change.
The new President should adopt a flexible posture. He should
increase significantly the resources devoted to international trade nego-
tiations. He should continue a strong effort in the Uruguay round. But
this alone is not enough. The President also should identify those
nations that are attractive targets for new bilateral or plurilateral agree-
ments and begin negotiations. The United States then should shift
resources to whichever of the two efforts demonstrates the most
progress.
If the United States makes it clear that it will pursue vigorously the
front where progress is forthcoming, it will send a message to the world
that it is serious about achieving its international economic objectives.
Perhaps the threat of bilateral agreements will serve as a catalyst to real
progress in the GATT round. Aside from the potential for positive
impact on the GATT, however, new bilateral agreements are desirable
in their own right. They should be treated as such; to proceed on any
other basis is to remain trapped in the GATT-first mindset.
V. Conclusion
If the new President continues the United States' historic pattern in
trade negotiations, America is not likely to achieve its objectives in the
GATT. But if the next President establishes a two-front strategy that
emphasizes bilateral and plurilateral agreements as well as the GATT,
the chances for success on both fronts greatly increase. In four years,
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the President may have concrete results to show for his efforts, instead
of a vague commitment to the GATT process.
It has become fashionable to speak about the decline of America.
But the lesson of United States economic retrenchment is not that
America must become a second rate world power. Rather, the lesson is
that the United States must look for new ways of approaching trade. To
again quote Dr. Kennedy:
In all the discussions about the erosion of American leadership, it needs
to be repeated again and again that the decline referred to is relative, not
absolute, and is therefore perfectly natural, and that the only serious
threat to the real interests of the United States can come from a failure to
adjust sensibly to the newer world order. 1 17
117. Id. at 534.
